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You Can’t Say That on Facebook:  
The NLRA’s Opprobriousness Standard  
and Social Media 
Elizabeth Allen

 
INTRODUCTION 
In January 2013, British music retailer HMV made headlines not 
only for its financial woes but also for its lay-offs, publicized by a 
terminated employee on HMV’s Twitter account.1 “[T]weeting live 
from HR where we’re all being fired!” was Poppy Rose Cleere, the 
company’s Social Media Planner, who reached out to Twitter in her 
frustration over the layoffs.
2
 A company in a bad situation suddenly 
found itself in an even worse one, as it lost its ability to control its 
public image. HMV’s still-employed Marketing Director reportedly 
asked, “How do I shut down Twitter?”3 
The HMV incident is illustrative of the complicated relationship 
employers have with social media. On the one hand, social media is a 
powerful tool companies want to utilize.
4
 It is inexpensive, far-
reaching, and effectively permanent. But these same attributes make 
social media dangerous. Because it is inexpensive, individuals can 
 
  J.D. (2014), Washington University School of Law in St. Louis; B.A. (2007), Rutgers 
University, English and Art History. 
 1. Emma Rowley, HMV Staffer Claims Responsibility for Tweeting Mass Sacking, 
TELEGRAPH, Jan. 31, 2013, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/retail 
andconsumer/9839855/HMV-staffer-claims-responsibility-for-tweeting-mass-sacking.html.  
 2. Id.  
 3. Id. 
 4. Illustratively, Cleere was the “social media planner” for HMV. Id. See Jennifer 
Preston, If Twitter is a Work Necessity, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2012, available at http://www. 
nytimes.com/2012/03/01/education/digital-skills-can-be-quickly-acquired.html?pagewanted=all 
(discussing a variety of programs and opportunities that educate on how to use social media to 
find employment and excel at work).  
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access the same platforms as deep-pocketed companies.
5
 Because 
social media is far-reaching, tweets like Cleere’s can be heard 
instantaneously around the world.
6
 And because information shared 
on the internet is immediately out of the control of the original poster, 
it is effectively permanent.
7
 Only twenty minutes passed before HMV 
was able to delete Cleere’s tweets, but that was sufficient time for 
their content to be viewed and shared by others.
8
 
The HMV incident is likewise illustrative of what is at stake for 
companies when social media is used against their interests. Although 
Cleere was tweeting on her company’s Twitter-feed, employers fear 
similar reputational damage from employees’ personal social media 
accounts.
9
 In response to these fears, companies have increasingly 
adopted and affirmed policies delineating their expectations for 
employees’ personal usage of social media.10 Employers have also 
disciplined employees whose social media posts have negatively 
portrayed the company.
11
 
 
 5. In 2010, an estimated 25 billion tweets were sent via Twitter, 360 billion exchanges 
were made on Facebook, and 730 billion videos were watched on YouTube. Nick Bilton, 2010 
Online, by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2011, available at http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2011/01/14/2010-online-the-numbers. Total global internet users totaled 1.97 billion. Id. 
 6. Social media speeds up the rates at which information can be exchanged across vast 
distances. See, e.g., Jennifer Preston, Social Media Gives Wall Street Protests a Global Reach, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2011, available at http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/15/ 
social-media-gives-wall-street-protests-a-global-reach (detailing the impressive increases in 
social media usage that coincided with the Occupy Wall Street movement).  
 7. Even after deleting a post, a copy of it may still exist elsewhere. See Jeffrey Rosen, 
The Web Means the End of Forgetting, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/magazine/25privacy-t2.html?pagewanted=all (discussing 
how shared information creates an internet reputation that can be difficult to escape). 
 8. Jon Hyman, The Revolution WILL be Televised . . . Shore Up Your Social Media 
Before a Termination, OHIO EMP’R L. BLOG (Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.ohioemployerlawblog. 
com/2013/02/the-revolution-will-be-televised-shore.html. 
 9. See, e.g., Margaret Sullivan, After an Outburst on Twitter, the Times Reinforces Its 
Social Media Guidelines, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2012, available at http://publiceditor.blogs.ny 
times.com/2012/10/17/after-an-outburst-on-twitter-the-times-reinforces-its-social-media-guide 
lines. 
 10. See id.; see also PROSKAUER ROSE, SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE WORKPLACE AROUND THE 
WORLD 2.0 2 (2012), http://www.proskauer.com/files/uploads/Documents/2012_ILG_Social_ 
Network_Survey_Results_Social_Media_2.0.pdf [hereinafter PROSKAUER REP.]. From 2011 to 
2012, employers with dedicated social media policies increased from 55 percent to 69 percent. 
Id. The majority of new policies impact both in- and out-of-work social media usage. Id. 
Approximately one-third of employers provide training on appropriate use of social media, and 
roughly half of employers have dealt with an employee’s misuse of social media. Id.  
 11. Terminations for social media postings have become so common, there is now a 
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At stake here are privacy rights,
12
 generational differences,
13
 and a 
society coming to terms with the indelible Internet.
14
 In April 2011, a 
new stakeholder in the social media dialogue joined the fight when 
Lafe E. Solomon, Acting General Counsel of the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB),
15
 directed a memorandum to regional 
NLRB offices.
16
 The Solomon Memorandum ordered NLRB regional 
offices to report to the Division of Advice
17
 before taking action on 
any “[case] involving employer rules prohibiting, or discipline of 
 
popular blog, The Facebook Fired, dedicated to telling the stories of notorious social media 
terminations. FACEBOOK FIRED, http://www.thefacebookfired.com (last visited Jan. 25, 2013). 
Likewise, celebrities have been fired for offensive tweets and status updates. See, e.g., Mark 
Memmott, Comedian Gilbert Gottfried Jokes about Japan, Loses Aflac Job, NAT’L PUB. RADIO 
(Mar. 15, 2011), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2011/03/15/134568422/comedian-gilbert-
gottfried-bombs-with-jokes-about-japan-loses-aflac-job (Aflac fired Gilbert Gottfried as the voice 
of their spokes-duck for tweeting insensitive comments about a Japanese earthquake.). Athletes 
have also lost their jobs as a result of social media posts. See, e.g., Mary Pilon, Twitter 
Comment Costs Greek Athlete Spot in Olympics, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2012, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/26/sports/olympics/twitter-comment-costs-greek-athlete-spot 
-in-olympics.html (discussing an athlete’s removal from the Olympic squad because of an 
offensive tweet). While firing a celebrity or an athlete for a social media comment may be 
arguably justified due to the notable’s influence, social media has likewise led to the 
termination of people in more common jobs, such as teaching. See, e.g., Jonathan Zimmerman, 
When Teachers Talk Out of School, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2011, available at http://www. 
nytimes.com/2011/06/04/opinion/04zimmerman.html (discussing teacher who was fired for 
comments on Facebook about her students). 
 12. See Alan Greenblatt, How Much Can Potential Employers Ask About You, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (May 22, 2010), http://www.npr.org/2012/05/21/153201730/how-much-can-
potential-employers-ask-about-you. 
 13. CISCO, CISCO CONNECTED WORLD TECH. REP., GEN Y: NEW DAWN FOR WORK, 
PLAY, IDENTITY 16 (2012), http://www.cisco.com/en/US/solutions/ns341/ns525/ns537/ns705/ 
ns1120/2012-CCWTR-Chapter1-Global-Results.pdf (reporting 40 percent of Gen Y survey 
participants indicated their employer prohibited social media use on company devices, but 71 
percent ignored the ban). 
 14. Rosen, supra note 7. 
 15. The National Labor Relations Board is a large governmental agency with a number of 
working parts. For purposes of this Note, “NLRB” will be used to discuss the agency as a 
whole; “the Board” to discuss the adjudicative panel that decides cases; and the “General 
Counsel” to discuss the department led by the General Counsel of the NLRB. See generally 
Who We Are, NAT’L LAB. REL. BD., http://nlrb.gov/who-we-are (last visited Dec. 25, 2013). 
 16. Memorandum from Lafe E. Solomon, Acting General Counsel, National Labor 
Relations Board, to All Regional Directors, Officers in Charge, and Resident Officers, National 
Labor Relations Board (Apr. 12, 2011), available at http://www.laborrelationsupdate.com/ 
GC%20Memorandum%2011-11.pdf [hereinafter Solomon Memo.].  
 17. The Division of Advice is charged with providing the NLRB Regional Offices with 
advice in cases that present novel or significant issues. See Investigate Charges, NAT’L LAB. 
REL. BD., http://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do/investigate-charges (last visited Jan. 24, 2013). 
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employees for engaging in, protected concerted activity using social 
media, such as Facebook or Twitter.”18  
Seeking to “be of assistance to practitioners and human resource 
professionals,”19 Solomon published three more memoranda20 in late 
2011 and early 2012, discussing cases that had been sent to the 
Division of Advice, and advising on what constituted a violation of 
employees’ statutory rights under the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA).
21
  
Solomon’s memoranda were just the beginning of the NLRB’s 
intervention
22
 on behalf of employees.
23
 Since 2011, numerous 
 
 18. Solomon Memo., supra note 16, at 1–2. 
 19. Memorandum from Anne Purcell, Associate General Counsel, National Labor 
Relations Board, to All Regional Directors, Officers in Charge, and Resident Officers, National 
Labor Relations Board (Aug. 18, 2011), available at www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-
story/actinggeneral-counsel-releases-report-employer-social-media-polices. 
 20. Id.; Memorandum from Anne Purcell, Associate General Counsel, National Labor 
Relations Board, to All Regional Directors, Officers in Charge, and Resident Officers, National 
Labor Relations Board (Jan. 24, 2012), available at www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-
story/actinggeneral-counsel-releases-report-employer-social-media-polices  [hereinafter Second 
Memo.]; Memorandum from Anne Purcell, Associate General Counsel, National Labor 
Relations Board, to All Regional Directors, Officers in Charge, and Resident Officers, National 
Labor Relations Board (May 30, 2012), available at www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-
story/actinggeneral-counsel-releases-report-employer-social-media-polices [hereinafter Third 
Memo.]. See Ashley Post, NLRB Sees Increase in Social Media-Related Cases, INSIDECOUNSEL 
(Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/03/20/ nlrb-sees-increase-in-social-media-
related-cases (discussing the circumstances leading to the publication of the memoranda). 
 21. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012). See also Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Wagner Act: 
Labor Law’s Signal Event, 64 MICH. B.J. 121, 121 (1985). 
 22. The NLRB’s outreach to address social media concerns has affected the non-
unionized workplace. See Steven Greenhouse, Even If It Enrages Your Boss, Social Net Speech 
is Protected, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/22/ 
technology/employers-social-media-policies-come-under-regulatory-scrutiny.html?pagewanted 
=all. Greenhouse reports: 
Some corporate officials say the N.L.R.B. is intervening in the social media scene in 
an effort to remain relevant as private-sector unions dwindle in size and power.  
“The [B]oard is using new legal theories to expand its power in the workplace,” said 
Randel K. Johnson, senior vice president for labor policy at the United States Chamber 
of Commerce. “It’s causing concern and confusion.”  
But [B]oard officials say they are merely adapting the provisions of the National Labor 
Relations Act, enacted in 1935, to the 21st century workplace.  
Id. The “concern and confusion” has led to a flurry of online and print publications addressing 
the cases decided to date, providing guidelines for practitioners, and advocating changes to the 
NLRB’s analyses. See, e.g., Jon Hyman, The NLRB’s Holiday Gift: a Facebook Firing 
Decision, OHIO EMP’R L. BLOG (Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.ohioemployerlawblog.com/2012/ 
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employees have filed cases with the NLRB, arguing their 
terminations for social media posts violated the NLRA.
24
 Cases of 
fired employees have now been heard by Administrative Law Judges 
(ALJs) and the Board; more, they are winding their way to the federal 
courts.
25
 The statutory right at issue is the right of employees—
unionized or nonunionized
26—to engage in protected concerted 
activity.
27
 These cases consider whether a social media post can 
constitute protected concerted activity
28
 and, if so, whether the post 
loses its protection due to opprobriousness.
29
 
This Note examines the NLRA’s opprobriousness standard30 as 
applied to social media cases. A standard for analyzing 
 
12/the-nlrbs-holiday-gift-facebook-firing.html#.UyDho4XiOlc (discussing a recently decided 
case and highlighting “two key points for employers”) and Colin M. Leonard & Tyler T. 
Hendry, From Peoria to Peru: NLRB Doctrine in a Social Media World, 63 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
199, 224–25 (2013) (addressing shortcomings of the analyses by the NLRB, General Counsel, 
and ALJs, and suggesting alternative considerations). 
 23. For purposes of this Note, the term “employee” will be used to refer to a person who 
is an “employee” as defined by the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012). In the same vein, the term 
“employer” also encompasses the NLRA’s definition. Id. 
 24. In general, the controversies in these cases dispute either an employer’s rule regarding 
social media, such as one found in an employee handbook, or the discipline of an employee for 
social media posts. See, e.g., Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. 164, 1 (2012) (ruling on 
both the employer’s “Courtesy” rule in its employee handbook and an employee’s termination 
for posts on Facebook). 
 25. See Greenhouse, supra note 22 (stating the defendants planned to appeal Hispanics 
United of Buffalo, 359 N.L.R.B. 1 (2012)). 
 26. The NLRA protects concerted activity of both unionized and nonunionized 
employees. Press Release, National Labor Relations Board, NLRB Launches Webpage 
Describing Protected Concerted Activity (June 18, 2012), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/ 
news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-launches-webpage-describing-protected-concerted-activity. In a 
press release announcing the launch of a new website to educate employees about their right to 
engage in concerted activity, this right was called “one of the best kept secrets of the [NLRA].” 
Id. 
 27. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).  
 28. See Office of the General Counsel, NLRB, Wal-Mart, Case 17-CA-25030 (July 19, 
2011) (Facebook posts complaining about manager were not protected concerted activity); 
Leonard & Hendry, supra note 22, at 210. 
 29. See Leonard & Hendry, supra note 22, at 217; Office of the General Counsel, NLRB, 
Detroit Medical Center, Case 7-CA-06682 (Jan. 10, 2012) [hereinafter Detroit Medical Center 
Advice Memo.] (advising that an employee’s Facebook posts constituted concerted activity but 
lost their protection due to their opprobrious nature). 
 30. Conduct that is otherwise protected concerted activity may lose its protection because 
it is opprobrious. Atlantic Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979) (“[E]ven an employee who 
is engaged in concerted protected activity can, by opprobrious conduct, lose the protection of 
the [NLRA].”). 
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opprobriousness in social media cases was discussed in Solomon’s 
Second Memorandum
31
 and was utilized in the General Counsel’s 
advice memoranda and in decisions by ALJs;
32
 but it has not yet been 
applied in any Board decision.
33
 This Note argues this standard 
provides a strong framework for analyzing when employees’ 
otherwise protected concerted activity on social media should lose its 
protection because the speech is impermissibly opprobrious, and 
argues that with certain modifications, this standard should be 
adopted by the NLRB and subsequently by courts. 
Part I of this Note examines the history of social media as related 
to the work environment. Part II describes the legal doctrine of 
opprobriousness under the NLRA. Part III presents the standard for 
analyzing opprobriousness, and provides summaries of the relevant 
cases and memoranda. Part IV analyzes the effectiveness of the 
opprobriousness standard and proposes the standard be adopted with 
certain modifications.   
 
 31. Second Memo., supra note 20, at 24 (“[A] modified Atlantic Steel analysis that 
considers not only disruption to workplace discipline, but that also borrows from Jefferson 
Standard to analyze the alleged disparagement of the employer’s products and services, would 
more closely follow the spirit of the Board’s jurisprudence regarding the protection afforded to 
employee speech [on social media sites].”). 
 32. See infra Part III. 
 33. In Karl Knauz, the Board considered the termination of an employee who had posted 
to Facebook about his employer on two separate occasions. 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164 (2012). 
Finding the employee’s posts about an accident at another employer-owned business were not 
protected concerted activity, the Board held that the employee’s termination was proper and did 
not reach the second set of Facebook posts. Id. at 1. However, the ALJ who decided the case 
below had found the second set of Facebook posts were not so opprobrious as to lose their 
protection. Id. at 17. In two other cases, the analysis did not trigger Atlantic Steel because of the 
pleadings. See Hispanics United of Buffalo, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 n.12 (2012); see also New 
York Party Shuttle, LLC, No. 02-CA-073340, 2012 WL 4174865 n.7 (Div. of Judges May 2, 
2013), adopted as modified by 359 N.L.R.B. No. 112 (2013). In Bettie Page Clothing, 359 
N.L.R.B. No. 96 (2013), the Board did not discuss opprobriousness. The validity of many 
recent Board decisions, including these four, has been called into question because of a recent 
ruling by the DC Circuit. See Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 507 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. 
granted, 133 S.Ct. 2861 (2013); Adam Liptak, Justices to Hear Case on Obama’s Recess 
Appointments, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/25/us/ 
justices-agree-to-hear-case-on-presidents-recess-appointments.html?_r=0. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol45/iss1/12
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I. SOCIAL MEDIA AT WORK 
Social media has become part of work in a number of ways. 
Employees use social media to find employment,
34
 and employers 
use social media to find employees.
35
 Companies also use social 
media to promote their businesses
36
 and communicate with 
customers.
37
 Through employee policies, employers can encourage or 
discourage employees to engage in social media.
38
  
There are many reasons why employers might want to control 
their employees’ social media use.39 Many employers cite concerns 
 
 34. For example, jobseekers may use LinkedIn, a social networking site developed for 
professionals. Linked in Reaches 200 Million Members Worldwide, LINKEDIN, http://press. 
linkedin.com/News-Releases/165/LinkedIn-reaches-200-million-members-worldwide (last visited 
Dec. 18, 2013). Jobseekers may also use the Internet and social media in particular to attract 
employers by building a personal brand around their experience and abilities. See Farhad 
Manjoo, Social Networking Your Way to a New Job, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/26/education/26SOCIAL.html?pagewanted=all (discussing 
jobseeker’s use of social media).  
 35. See Julie Weed, Finding New Employees, via Social Networks, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 
2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/31/jobs/31recruit.html. Employers also 
utilize social media sites to investigate potential hires. The notion that employers check social 
media before hiring has gone from being shocking to a practice so routine and regular that there 
are now companies that provide this service for others. See Alan Finder, For Some, Online 
Persona Undermines a Resume, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes. 
com/2006/06/11/us/11recruit.html?pagewanted=all. See also Jennifer Preston, Social Media 
History Becomes a New Job Hurdle, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2011, available at http://www.ny 
times.com/2011/07/21/technology/social-media-history-becomes-a-new-job-hurdle.html?page 
wanted=all. The employer practice of asking jobseekers for social media passwords has sparked 
legislative action. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL. § 3-712 (West 2012) (banning 
employers from requiring disclosure of Facebook passwords). As of January 1, 2013, six states 
have likewise passed legislation that prevents employers from requiring employee disclosure of 
Facebook passwords. See Greenhouse, supra note 22. 
 36. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 37. See Ben Bergman, Tweeting Food Truck Draws L.A.’s Hungry Crowds, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (Mar. 23, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=101881984 
(using Twitter to inform customers of the daily location of the moving business); see also ‘Ev’ 
and ‘Biz’ See Bright Future for Twitter, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 11, 2009), http://www.npr. 
org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=101727464 (where founders of Twitter discuss 
how Twitter is used, for example, to follow the changing state regulations of Idaho, to find new 
business ventures, and to get fans to a club where a band is playing). 
 38. See PROSKAUER REP., supra note 10, at 2. 
 39. Id. Employers’ attitudes have become more positive toward social media, both for 
business and non-business use. In 2012, 40 percent of employers considered it an advantage to 
allow employees to use social media. This is a significant increase from 2011, when only 30 
percent of employers considered it an advantage to allow employees to use social media for 
business and non-business use. At the same time, however, there has been a significant increase 
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about efficiency and effectiveness at work, arguing if their employees 
are on Facebook, they are not working.
40
 Employers also worry that 
employees’ use of social media might violate federal securities 
laws,
41
 or result in harassment
42
 or bullying.
43
 Moreover, employers 
are concerned about their company’s public image, which might be 
negatively influenced by their employees’ online footprints unless the 
company regulates its employees’ social media activities.44 These 
concerns are not limited to employers: employees are likewise 
concerned about what their employers might think of their social 
media activity.
45
 
 
in the number of employers who monitor usage of social media sites, rising from 27 percent in 
2011 to 36 percent in 2012. Id. 
 40. See ETHICS RES. CTR., NAT’L BUS. ETHICS SURVEY OF SOC. NETWORKERS 20–23 
(2013), available at http://www.ethics.org/nbes; see also PROSKAUER REP., supra note 10, at 11 
(reporting that more than half of people aged twenty-five to thirty-four use social media at 
work, more than any other age category). 
 41. Investment banks that have banned social media cite federal regulations requiring 
them to retain communication for three years. See Michael Kaplan, Banned on Wall St.: 
Facebook, Twitter and Gmail, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2012, available at http://dealbook. 
nytimes.com/2012/11/22/banned-on-wall-street-facebook-twitter-and-gmail and Records to be 
Preserved by Certain Exchange Members, Brokers and Dealers, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-4 (2012).  
 42. See Hilary Stout, Less ‘He Said, She Said’ in Sex Harassment Cases, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 5, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/06/jobs/in-sex-harassment-cases-
less-he-said-she-said.html (discussing how technology has changed workplace harassment). 
 43. In Hispanics United of Buffalo, employees were terminated for a conversation about 
another employee on Facebook that their supervisor considered bullying and harassment in 
violation of the company’s workplace policy. 359 N.L.R.B. 37, 1–2 (2012). Workplace bullying 
is a serious problem at many companies, with as many as 37 percent of employees saying they 
have been bullied at work. Tara Parker-Pope, When the Bully Sits in the Next Cubicle, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 25, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/25/health/ 25well.html.  
 44. See Uttoran Sen, 50 Ways Social Media Can Destroy Your Business, KISSMETRICS 
(Dec. 22, 2013), http://blog.kissmetrics.com/social-media-can-destroy/. Sen provides the 
example of McDonald’s failed Twitter campaign known as #McDStories. Id. Within two hours 
of the launch, 73,000 tweets were posted with the hashtag, many with negative comments. 
Social Media PR Disasters: #McDStories, BRANDEBLOG (Feb. 20, 2012, 1:31 PM), http:// 
brandemixblog.blogspot.com/2012/02/social-media-pr-disasters-mcdstories_20.html. McDonald’s 
pulled the Twitter promotion because of the negative comments. Id. Comments came from both 
customers and employees. Id. However, while the negative comments received publicity, they 
accounted for only a small portion of the total tweets. Id. Moreover, McDonald’s Annual 
Report shows there was little if any negative impact from the promotion: the first quarter of 
2012, when the Twitter episode occurred, showed an increase in revenues from the first quarter 
of 2011. See MCDONALD’S 2012 ANNUAL REP. (2012), available at http://www.about 
mcdonalds.com/content/dam/AboutMcDonalds/Investors/Investor%202013/2012%20Annual%
20Report%20Final.pdf.  
 45. According to a recent survey, 79 percent of employees consider their employer’s 
reaction prior to making a work-related post on a social media site. ETHICS RES. CTR., supra 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol45/iss1/12
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Employers have taken a variety of steps to control employees’ 
social media use. Some employers have developed policies 
prohibiting the use of personal accounts during the work day.
46
 
Employers hope these policies will enable them to better protect the 
reputation of the business
47
 and to minimize negative interactions 
amongst employees.
48
 Some employers have gone so far as to block 
certain websites on company equipment.
49
 Employers have also 
sought to prohibit employees from posting messages about the 
company, and have encouraged employees to consider professional 
image and the company’s interest before posting.50 For violating 
companies’ social media policies, many employees have been fired.51 
In response, employees have challenged the legality of their 
terminations for social media activities on a number of grounds, 
including privacy
52
 and freedom of speech.
53
 Employees have also 
 
note 40, at 23. Moreover, 64 percent of employees state that they consider how their employer 
would react to a personal posting on a social media site. Id.  
 46. See PROSKAUER REP., supra note 10, at 19. Although not the subject of this Note, the 
NLRB has also analyzed many companies’ social media policies. See, e.g., Karl Knauz Motors, 
Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164, 1 (2012) (“The Board also adopted the judge’s finding that a 
‘Courtesy’ rule in the employee handbook violated [NLRA § 8(a)(1)] because employees would 
reasonably believe that it prohibited statements of protest or criticism of the employer, 
including those protected by the [NLRA].”). 
 47. See, e.g., Office of the General Counsel, NLRB, Stant USA Corp., Case 26-CA-24098 
(Oct. 13, 2011). Stant USA’s social media policy prohibited “name calling, unfounded 
statements, or behavior that will reflect negatively on Stant’s reputation,” and advised 
employees to “[b]e aware that your actions captured via images, posts, or comments can reflect 
upon Stant.” Id. at 2. 
 48. See, e.g., id. Stant USA’s social media policy required employees to “[h]onor privacy 
rights of other associates by seeking their permission before writing about them or displaying 
information that may be considered to be a breach of their privacy and confidentiality.” Id. 
 49. Over one-quarter of all employers block employee access. PROSKAUER REP., supra 
note 10, at 2.  
 50. See, e.g., Third Memo., supra note 20, at 12 (quoting a social media policy stating that 
“[e]mployees should avoid harming the image and integrity of the company”); see also supra 
notes 47 and 48 and accompanying text. 
 51. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.  
 52. See Roberts v. Careflite, No. 02–12–00105–CV, 2012 WL 4662962, at *3 (2012) 
(finding that because the viewing of a Facebook post would not be considered highly intrusive 
by a reasonable person, the event that led to the firing could not be considered an invasion of 
privacy).  
 53. See Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 384–86 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that “liking” a 
Facebook status is protected as speech under the First Amendment); see also Mattingly v. 
Milligan, No. 4:11CV00215 JLH, 2011 WL 5184283, at *6 (E.D. Ark. 2011) (holding that a 
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turned to the NLRB, arguing their social media posts are protected by 
the NLRA.
54
 
II. THE NLRA’S OPPROBRIOUSNESS STANDARD 
The NLRA is a fundamental piece of New Deal legislation
55
 
passed at a time of high hostility to employee organization.
56
 Signed 
into law by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the NLRA has, for 
more than seventy-five years, been a cornerstone of American labor 
law.
57
 The NLRA established the NLRB,
58
 a quasi-judicial 
administrative agency tasked with eliminating the restraint on 
commerce caused by employers who deny employees the right to 
bargain collectively.
59
 
Two sections of the NLRA apply in cases that challenge social 
media terminations. The first is § 7,
60
 which gives employees the 
right to engage in “concerted activities”61 for “mutual aid or 
 
post on Facebook about recently terminated employees could constitute constitutionally-
protected free speech). 
 54. See, e.g., Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164 (2012) (“This is the first 
case in which the Board has ruled on an unlawful discharge allegation involving Facebook 
posts.”). 
 55. See James Gross, The NLRB: Then and Now, 26 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 213, 213–14 
(Winter 2010). 
 56. See WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR 
MOVEMENT 33, 52 n.79, 151–52, 199–201 (1991) (citing examples of judicial hostility to 
employee organization). 
 57. See Gross, supra note 55, at 213.  
 58. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).  
 59. See Gross, supra note 55, at 214–15; see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 153–56 (2012) (describing 
the organization of the NLRB). 
 60. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 61. Id. Whether conduct is concerted is analyzed under the Meyers cases. See Meyers 
Indus., Inc. (Meyers I), 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 496–97 (1984), rev’d sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 755 
F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948 (1985), on remand, Meyers Indus., Inc. 
(Meyers II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882 (1986), aff’d sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 
1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1205 (1988). As announced in Meyers I, “In general, to find an 
employee’s activity to be ‘concerted,’ we shall require that it be engaged in with or on the 
authority of other employees, and not solely by and on behalf of the employee himself.” Meyers 
I, 268 N.L.R.B. at 497. Meyers II added to the analysis, clarifying that concerted activity 
includes “those circumstances where individual employees seek to initiate or to induce or to 
prepare for group action, as well as individual employees bringing truly group complaints to the 
attention of management.” Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. at 887.  
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protection.”62 The second is § 8,63 which makes it an “unfair labor 
practice”64 to “restrain or coerce”65 employees in the exercise of their 
§ 7 rights.
66
 Employees who believe their rights under the NLRA 
have been violated are encouraged to file a complaint with their 
regional NLRB office.
67
 Non-unionized employees can likewise file 
complaints with the NLRB.
68
  
If conduct is found to be concerted activity undertaken for mutual 
protection,
69
 the question remains whether it is protected by the 
 
 62. 29 U.S.C. § 157. Conduct is engaged in for purposes of “mutual aid or protection” 
when the employees “seek to improve terms and conditions of employment or otherwise 
improve their lot as employees through channels outside the immediate employer-employee 
relationship.” Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565 (1978).  
 63. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2012). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. The NLRA delineates a procedure for filing a complaint against an employer. The 
Unfair Labor Practice Process Chart, NAT’L LAB. REL. BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/resources/ 
nlrb-process/unfair-labor-practice-process-chart (last visited Jan. 24, 2009). The NLRB’s 
Regional Director investigates the complaint to determine whether formal action is merited. 
Temporary injunctive relief may be sought from the district court. Id. If the case involves 
unlawful boycotting or certain forms of picketing, the Regional Director must seek a temporary 
injunction. If formal action is merited, the case may reach an ALJ. The ALJ’s decision becomes 
the decision of the Board, unless a timely exception is filed. Id. A timely exception leads to the 
dismissal of the case, a remedial order directed at the employer, or a return to the ALJ if there 
are objections. In the case of a dismissal, the employee may appeal to the federal court system 
for review; in the case of a remedial order, the employer may appeal to the federal court system 
for review, and the employee may apply to the federal court system to have his order enforced. 
Id.  
 68. It is a common misconception that the NLRB’s jurisdiction is limited to the unionized 
workforce. See supra text accompanying note 26. The NLRB has taken strides to inform 
workers of their rights under the NLRA. See NAT’L LAB. REL. BD., EMP. RIGHTS UNDER THE 
NAT’L LAB. REL. ACT, available at http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-
page/node-3788/employeerightsposter-8-5x11.pdf. Additionally, in 2011, the NLRB promulgated 
a rule requiring employers to post notice of employees’ rights under the NLRA. Notification of 
Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,006 (Aug. 30, 2011) 
(codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 104). Federal courts, however, have granted injunctions, holding that 
the NLRB lacks the authority to promulgate such a rule. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. 
NLRB, 721 F.3d 152, 154 (4th Cir. 2013); Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947, 963–
64 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 69. When social media posts constitute concerted activity for mutual aid or protection is 
subject to debate. See, e.g., Leonard & Hendry, supra note 22, at 208–09. However, for 
purposes of this Note, the discussion is limited to the conditions under which otherwise 
protected concerted activity loses its protection due to opprobriousness. 
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NLRA.
70
 The NLRA does not restrict all employers’ rights in favor 
of employees.
71
 In certain cases, employees’ conduct may be so 
violent, disloyal, unlawful, or in breach of contract as to be classified 
as “opprobrious” and therefore unprotected by the NLRA.72 
Concerted activity will seldom lose its protection because it is 
opprobrious.
73
 As recognized by the Seventh Circuit:  
[A] distinction is to be drawn between cases where employees 
engaged in concerted activities [that] exceed the bounds of 
lawful conduct in “a moment of animal exuberance” or in a 
manner not activated by improper motives, and those flagrant 
cases in which the misconduct is so violent or of such serious 
character as to render the employee unfit for further service, 
and that it is only in the latter type of cases that the courts find 
that the protection of the right of employees to full freedom in 
self-organizational activities should be subordinated to the 
vindication of the interests of society as a whole.
74
 
Therefore, if the conduct is concerted, the NLRA might protect 
conduct otherwise considered unlawful, and reserves the 
opprobriousness standard for only the most flagrant cases.
75
 
Employees are allowed, for example, to use sarcasm when engaging 
in concerted activity.
76
 Likewise, the language used can be 
 
 70. See NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 17 (1962) (holding that walking out 
of a factory in protest of its freezing temperature was a protected concerted activity and that it 
was not “indefensible”). However, where terminated employees engaged in protected concerted 
activity and a second activity that is not statutorily protected, courts utilize the Wright Line 
analysis to determine whether the employer violated the NLRA. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 
1083 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981). See NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 
U.S. 393, 395 (1983). 
 71. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937) (“The [NLRA] does 
not interfere with the normal exercise of the right of the employer to select its employees or to 
discharge them.”). 
 72. See Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. at 17; Atlantic Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 
(1979). 
 73. See NLRB v. Ill. Tool Works, 153 F.2d 811, 815–16 (7th Cir. 1946) (citations 
omitted) (finding an employee who may have committed libel against his employer had not 
engaged in conduct so opprobrious as to lose NLRA protection). 
 74. Id. 
 75. See, e.g., id.  
 76. See, e.g., Pontiac Osteopathic Hosp., 284 N.L.R.B. 442, 452 (1986) (“[T]he fact that 
the [employees] used the literary techniques of satire and irony to make their point, as opposed 
to a more neutral factual recitation of their dissatisfaction, does not deprive the communication 
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unpleasant,
77
 it can include curses,
78
 and supervisors can be called 
hurtful names.
79
  
However, under certain circumstances, offensive language can 
violate the opprobriousness standard’s high bar. In Atlantic Steel,80 an 
employee called his supervisor an obscene name
81
 and was 
discharged.
82
 In determining that the discharge did not violate the 
NLRA, the Board announced a new standard for employee 
communications that include obscenities.
83
 Under Atlantic Steel, four 
factors must be weighed: “(1) the place of the discussion; (2) the 
subject matter of the discussion; (3) the nature of the employee’s 
outburst; and (4) whether the outburst was, in any way, provoked by 
an employer’s unfair labor practice.”84 The Atlantic Steel standard 
attempts to balance the employer’s interest in an orderly work 
environment with the employee’s right to engage in concerted 
activity.
85
  
 
that they produced of any protection under Section 7 of the [NLRA] to which it might otherwise 
by entitled.”). 
 77. See, e.g., Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244, 249 (1997) (flippant language 
was not impermissibly opprobrious). 
 78. See, e.g., Alcoa, Inc., 352 N.L.R.B. 1222, 1226 (2008) (“egotistical f—er” was not 
impermissibly opprobrious). Where profane employee speech is quoted in this Note, the 
language is provided as reported in the case or memoranda. 
 79. See, e.g., Groves Truck & Trailer, 281 N.L.R.B. 1194, 1195 (1986) (calling the 
company’s CEO a “cheap son of a bitch” was not impermissibly opprobrious). 
 80. Atlantic Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979). 
 81. Witnesses’ accounts differed. Id. at 814. The employee may have called the foreman a 
“lying son of a bitch” or a “m—f—liar.” Id. Alternatively, he may have stated that the foreman 
had told a “m—f—lie.” Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 817. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Office of the General Counsel, NLRB, Wolters Kluwer, Case 18-CA-64873 (Nov. 
28, 2011) [hereinafter Wolters Kluwer Advice Memo.] (“Atlantic Steel is generally used to 
analyze communications between employees and supervisors, and specifically focuses on 
whether those communications would disrupt or undermine shop discipline.”). A recent Second 
Circuit case, NLRB v. Starbucks, limited the applicability of Atlantic Steel. 679 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 
2012). In Starbucks, the Second Circuit held that Atlantic Steel did not apply for cases in 
“public venues where customers are present.” Id at 79. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
208 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 45:195 
 
 
III. ADAPTING ATLANTIC STEEL FOR A SOCIAL MEDIA ANALYSIS 
Although Atlantic Steel has not been adapted for use in social 
media cases by the Board,
86
 the NLRB’s General Counsel and some 
ALJs have utilized Atlantic Steel in such a context.
87
 However, their 
analyses are inconsistent and result in confusion.
88
  
The NLRB’s General Counsel suggested a modified test in the 
Second Memorandum that utilized the factors from Atlantic Steel and 
incorporated an analysis from a second case, Jefferson Standard.
89
 
While “Atlantic Steel is generally used to analyze communications 
between employees and supervisors, and specifically focuses on 
whether the communications would disrupt or undermine shop 
discipline,”90 Jefferson Standard is used for “employee 
communications that are intended to appeal directly to third parties, 
with an eye toward whether those communications reference a labor 
dispute and are so disparaging of the employer or its product as to 
lose the protection of the [NLRA].”91 Recognizing that neither 
Atlantic Steel nor Jefferson Standard properly address the 
circumstances surrounding social media postings by employees about 
their employers,
92
 the Second Memorandum suggested “a modified 
 
 86. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 87. See infra notes 89–121. 
 88. See infra notes 105–20. 
 89. Second Memo., supra note 20, at 24 (“Thus, we decided that a modified Atlantic Steel 
analysis that considers not only disruption to workplace discipline, but that also borrows from 
Jefferson Standard to analyze the alleged disparagement of the employer’s products and 
services, would more closely follow the spirit of the Board’s jurisprudence regarding the 
protection afforded to employee speech.”). The facts of Jefferson Standard are as follows: 
during a labor dispute, employees in a union printed 5,000 handbills and distributed them on the 
picket line and at locations such as barber shops that were two or three blocks from the plant. 
NLRB v. Electrical Workers Local 1229 (Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464, 467–68 (1953). 
They also mailed the handbills to local businesses. Id. The handbills stated that Jefferson 
Standard Broadcasting Company had inferior equipment and broadcasted inferior television 
programs in the city. Id. The handbills, however, made no reference “to the union, to a labor 
controversy or to collective bargaining.” Id.  
 90. Second Memo., supra note 20, at 24. 
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. Neither test is appropriate because:  
Considering the focus and traditional application of Jefferson Standard, we concluded 
that it did not provide a suitable framework to analyze the Facebook posting here. We 
determined that this Facebook discussion was more analogous to a conversation 
among employees that is overheard by third parties than an intentional dissemination 
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Atlantic Steel analysis that considers not only disruption to workplace 
discipline, but that also borrows from Jefferson Standard to analyze 
the alleged disparagement of the employer’s products and services.”93 
The General Counsel has provided guidelines for how to modify 
the Atlantic Steel standard to account for the unique aspects of social 
media postings.
94
 In particular, the “place of the discussion” factor 
must be adjusted for a social media analysis.
95
 Under the General 
Counsel’s guidelines, first, the “place” factor should be used to 
analyze whether the Facebook postings disrupt the workplace.
96
 This 
analysis comports with the traditional Atlantic Steel analysis.
97
 
Second, “place” and “nature of the outburst” should “merge to 
require consideration of the impact of the fact that the discussion 
could be viewed by third parties.”98 This change is necessary because 
by posting on a social media site, the comments are made public.
99
 
Jefferson Standard should then be incorporated to consider whether 
 
of employer information to the public seeking their support, and thus that an Atlantic 
Steel analysis would be more appropriate. We recognized, however, that a Facebook 
posting does not exactly mirror the situation in an Atlantic Steel analysis, which 
typically focuses on whether the communications would disrupt or undermine shop 
discipline. We also noted that the Atlantic Steel analysis does not usually consider the 
impact of disparaging comments made to third parties. 
Id.  
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. at 22–25.  
 95. The other Atlantic Steel factors—the outburst’s subject matter and whether the 
outburst was provoked by an unfair labor practice—are unchanged. See Wolters Kluwer Advice 
Memo., supra note 85, at 4 (“The application of two of the Atlantic Steel factors to a social 
media posting is straight forward: the subject matter and whether the discussion was provoked 
by an unfair labor practice.”); see also Second Memo., supra note 20, at 24–25 (conducting an 
analysis of the subject matter and unfair labor practice factors that does not incorporate special 
considerations that social media could warrant). 
 96. Second Memo., supra note 20, at 25. 
 97. Atlantic Steel, 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816–17 (1979) (reasoning that the outburst took 
place on the production floor instead of in a grievance meeting and therefore was more likely to 
undermine shop discipline). 
 98. Second Memo., supra note 20, at 25. 
 99. However, the General Counsel recognized that social media posts are generally not 
viewed by a universal audience. Id. (“[G]iven that the conversation was also viewed by some 
small number of non-employee members of the public, we also considered the impact of the . . . 
posting on the Employer’s reputation and business.”). Alternatively, where the social media 
posts were limited to an audience of employees and former employees of the business, the 
General Counsel only utilized Atlantic Steel. Office of the General Counsel, NLRB, Phenom 
Hospitality, LLC, Case 04-CA-061044 at 6 (Jan. 17, 2012) (utilizing Atlantic Steel to determine 
opprobriousness). 
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the outburst was “disparaging” to the employer in such a way that it 
warrants a loss of protection.
100
 
The General Counsel applied this double analysis of “place” when 
it analyzed the case of an employee terminated because of her 
Facebook post criticizing her work environment.
101
 Under the first 
analysis of place, the General Counsel concluded that because “[t]he 
discussion occurred at home during non-work hours, [it] was not so 
disruptive of workplace discipline as to weigh in favor of losing 
protection under a traditional Atlantic Steel analysis.”102 Under the 
second analysis, the General Counsel found the comments were “not 
defamatory or otherwise so disparaging as to lose protection of the 
[NLRA].”103 
Alternatively, the General Counsel conflated the “place” analysis 
in an advice memorandum regarding Wolters Kluwer,
104
 where an 
employer terminated an employee for tweeting a profane message 
about software used at work on his personal Twitter account.
105
 Using 
the modified Atlantic Steel standard, the General Counsel concluded 
the tweet was not so opprobrious as to lose protection.
106
 Analyzing 
“place” in concert with the “nature of the outburst,” the General 
Counsel reasoned that “[t]he nature of the discussion, considered in 
 
 100. Second Memo., supra note 20, at 23–24. The modified Atlantic Steel analysis 
therefore only incorporates the first prong of Jefferson Standard. See id. at 24. 
 101. Id. at 22–25. The Second Memorandum is a compilation of cases submitted to the 
Division of Advice in 2011. Id. at 1. In this particular case, the facts are as follows: the 
employee who brought the action under the NLRA worked at a popcorn packaging facility. Id. 
at 22. Prior to the relevant Facebook postings, the employee and several of her coworkers had 
discussed the operation manager’s negative attitude with one another and with other managers. 
Id. The employee and two of her coworkers had a conversation on Facebook in which they 
discussed a variety of things related to work. Id. at 22–23. The employee stated that she hated 
working at the popcorn packaging facility, wanted to find a new job, and believed that the 
operation manager was to blame for the problems at the facility. Id. at 23. Shortly after posting 
these messages, the employee was terminated for her comments on Facebook. Id. 
 102. Id. at 25. 
 103. Id.  
 104. Wolters Kluwer Advice Memo., supra note 85, at 1.  
 105. The employee’s tweet complained about a new software system by Ektron. He 
tweeted: “10x the horsepower but –l0x productivity. suck my ass ektron.” Id. at 2. Wolters 
Kluwer was published nearly two months before the Second Memorandum. Compare id. at 1 
(dated Nov. 28, 2011) with Second Memo., supra note 20, at 1 (dated Jan. 24, 2012). However, 
because the Second Memorandum is a compilation of decisions within the last year by the 
General Counsel, id., it is unclear which case was decided first.  
 106. Wolters Kluwer Advice Memo., supra note 85, at 6. 
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light of the fact that it was not disruptive of the workplace but [could] 
be viewed by the public, also weighed in favor of protection.”107 The 
General Counsel therefore considered both facets of “place” 
simultaneously, instead of separately, as in the Second 
Memorandum.
108
 
The General Counsel further mottled this dual analysis of “place” 
in a subsequent advice memorandum regarding Detroit Medical 
Center
109
 to an employer who terminated an employee for Facebook 
posts about his coworkers.
110
 The General Counsel found that “[t]he 
location of the discussion—on Facebook—resulted in wide 
circulation of the [employee’s] comments among his coworkers and 
weigh[ed] against protection because those comments caused a major 
disruption in the workplace.”111 The General Counsel, moreover, did 
not consider the impact of the employee’s comments on the 
employer’s image, because “the comments that were the basis for the 
[employee’s] discipline were directed against his fellow employees 
and did not disparage the Employer or the services it provides.”112 
Thus, the General Counsel only considered the effects of the 
comments on the workplace and not the impact it might have had on 
the employer’s reputation.  
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Second Memo., supra note 20, at 24–25.  
 109. Detroit Medical Center Advice Memo., supra note 29, at 1. 
 110. In one post, the discharged employee stated, “Well the jealous ass ghetto people that I 
work with took away my opportunity to advance my career today.” Id. at 2. In another post, the 
employee wrote about his opposition to the union at his employer: “United we stand to protect 
generations of bad lazy piece of shit workers!!!!” and “I can’t wait for Vanguard to get rid of 
the union at the end of the year[,] enjoy the unemployment line with your no-educated asses.” 
Id. 
 111. Id. at 5. Alternatively, in the Second Memorandum and Wolters Kluwer, the General 
Counsel found that because the employee made the statements on Facebook at home, there was 
little disruption to the workplace. Second Memo., supra note 20, at 5; Wolters Kluwer Advice 
Memo., supra note 85, at 6.  
 112. Detroit Medical Center Advice Memo., supra note 29, at 4–5. In the Second 
Memorandum, the General Counsel specified that the Jefferson Standard analysis would be of 
limited use to “analyze the alleged disparagement of the employer’s products and services.” 
Second Memo., supra note 20, at 24. 
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Like the General Counsel, some ALJs have utilized Atlantic Steel 
in social media cases.
113
 In Triple Play,
114
 the ALJ analyzed the 
discharged employees’ Facebook comments115 under Atlantic Steel 
and Jefferson Standard, and found the discharge violated the 
NLRA.
116
 The ALJ did not merge the analyses of “place” and “nature 
of the outburst” but instead considered each in turn, incorporating the 
Jefferson Standard concerns under the nature of the outburst 
analysis.
117
 Analyzing place, the ALJ reasoned the place of the 
conversation—Facebook—actually “militate[d] in favor of a finding 
that [the employees’] comments did not lose the protection of the 
[NLRA]. The comments occurred during a Facebook conversation, 
and not at the workplace itself, so there [was] no possibility that the 
discussion would have disrupted [the] work environment.”118 While 
 
 113. See Butler Medical Transport, LLC, NLRB, Case 5-CA-97810, at 3 n.1 (Div. of 
Judges Sept. 4, 2013) and Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille, NLRB, Case 34-CA-12915 (Div. of 
Judges Jan. 3, 2012).  
 114. Triple Play, Case 34-CA-12915. Triple Play was published after Wolters Kluwer but 
before the Second Memorandum. Compare id. at 1 (dated Jan. 3, 2012) with Wolters Kluwer 
Advice Memo., supra note 85, at 1 (dated Nov. 28, 2011) and Second Memo., supra note 20, at 
1 (dated Jan. 24, 2012). Triple Play, unlike Wolters Kluwer and the Second Memorandum, was 
decided by an ALJ and not the General Counsel. See Triple Play, Case 34-CA-12915, at 1 
(decided by ALJ Lauren Esposito). However, attorneys from the General Counsel’s office 
argued on behalf of the discharged employees and presented a brief that utilized Atlantic Steel 
and Jefferson Standard. See id. at 7 (citations omitted) (“Applying the Board’s analysis 
articulated in [Atlantic Steel], General Counsel argues that given the location and subject matter 
of the Facebook discussion, the nature of the ‘outburst,’ and the extent to which the outburst 
was provoked by [the employer’s] conduct, [the employees’] comments on [the] Facebook 
account remained protected activity. General Counsel also argues that [the employees’] 
comments did not constitute disparaging and disloyal statements unprotected under [Jefferson 
Standard] and its progeny.”). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the ALJ who decided 
the case was aware of the General Counsel’s modified Atlantic Steel analysis.  
 115. Triple Play, Case 34-CA-12915, at 9–14. The Facebook conversation regarded a 
mistake that Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille (the “Restaurant”) made in calculating taxes that 
resulted in their employees owing additional money to the state at the year’s end. Id. at 3. 
Upset, a former employee posted about it on Facebook, and some current employees and 
customers commented on the status, posting negative statements about the Restaurant and its 
owners. Id. at 3–4. Comments by employees included: “I FUCKING OWE MONEY TOO!” 
and “Such an asshole” (referring to the owner). Id. 
 116. Id. at 14. 
 117. Id. at 9–14. Compare id. with Wolters Kluwer Advice Memo., supra note 86, at 6 and 
Second Memo., supra note 20, at 22–25. 
 118. Triple Play, Case 34-CA-12915, at 10 (emphasis added); see supra note 109 and 
accompanying text. But see Detroit Medical Center Advice Memo., supra note 29, at 5 (finding 
that a Facebook conversation did disrupt work). 
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analyzing the place factor, the ALJ noted that customers viewed the 
conversation, but found there was “insufficient evidence” the 
employer’s business was in any way harmed by the customers’ 
viewing of the messages.
119
 Incorporating Jefferson Standard into the 
nature of the outburst analysis, the ALJ considered whether the 
Facebook posts constituted a “disparaging attack upon the quality of 
a company’s product and its business policies, in a manner 
reasonably calculated to harm the company’s reputation and its 
income,”120 and found they did not.121  
IV. FURTHER ADAPTING ATLANTIC STEEL TO CREATE A WORKABLE 
STANDARD FOR OPPROBRIOUSNESS IN SOCIAL MEDIA 
The NLRB and courts should adopt a modified Atlantic Steel 
standard as a uniform standard for opprobriousness in social media 
cases. First, there is clear need
122
 for a well-articulated standard for 
analyzing when social media posts that would otherwise constitute 
protected concerted activity
123
 lose their protection due to the 
opprobriousness of the language. Without a clear standard, 
employees cannot understand when their rights have been violated, 
and employers do not realize when they have crossed the line by 
firing an employee for an NLRA-protected post.
124
 
Second, a modified Atlantic Steel test has many strengths. Atlantic 
Steel is deep-rooted in NLRB jurisprudence, which lends credibility 
 
 119. Triple Play, Case 34-CA-12915, at 10. The ALJ reasoned that because the Facebook 
posts could only be viewed by the “friends” of the people posting on Facebook, the posts were 
not “specifically directed to the public at large.” Id. at 13. 
 120. Id. at 11 (citing NLRB v. Electrical Workers Local 1229 (Jefferson Standard), 346 
U.S. 464, 472 (1953)). 
 121. Id. at 13 (reasoning that the comments “were not a gratuitous attempt to injure [their 
employer’s] business . . . [or] an attack on [their employer’s] product. They did not address, for 
example, the quality of food, beverages, services, or entertainment at [the] restaurant and bar, 
but were solely related to the employees’ owing taxes to the state.”).  
 122. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. From 2010 to 2013, more than one hundred 
social media cases were filed with the NLRB. See Post, supra note 20. 
 123. Likewise, there is a need for clearer guidelines as to when social media posts 
constitute protected concerted activities. However, this Note focuses on the opprobriousness 
analysis. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 124. Because non-unionized employers and employees are frequently unaware of their 
rights under the NLRA, this issue is further exacerbated in non-unionized workplaces. See 
supra notes 26 and 68 and accompanying text. 
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to its application.
125
 It is also a flexible test that can balance the 
actualities of the workplace.
126
 Furthermore, the test recognizes that a 
social media post can both negatively impact the company’s image 
and the well-being of its employees.
127
 
Although a modified Atlantic Steel test has many strengths, it also 
has potential shortcomings. While its deep roots in NLRB 
jurisprudence can be a strength, that might also be a weakness. A 
modified test is limited by the historical holdings of Jefferson 
Standard and Atlantic Steel. For example, in Detroit Medical Center, 
the General Counsel refused to consider Jefferson Standard because 
the employee had disparaged his coworkers, and Jefferson Standard 
only governs disparaging remarks about the employer or his goods 
and services.
128
 Instead, the General Counsel used the Atlantic Steel 
test, which does not consider the impact social media posts have on 
an employer’s reputation with third parties,129 who may draw 
inferences about the employer based on an employee’s comments 
 
 125. The Board and ALJs have utilized the Atlantic Steel test since it was decided in 1979, 
and many federal courts have affirmed their decisions. See, e.g., Media Gen. Operations v. 
NLRB, 560 F.3d 181, 186–89 (4th Cir. 2009) (affirming NLRB’s decision, which applied 
Atlantic Steel to determine whether a termination was lawful). Jefferson Standard is likewise 
deeply rooted, as it was decided in 1953. See Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 472. Jefferson 
Standard has also been utilized and affirmed by the Board, ALJs, and the federal courts. See, 
e.g., Five Star Transp., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 F.3d 46, 48 (1st Cir. 2008) (affirming NLRB’s 
decision, which considered Jefferson Standard when finding employee’s conduct was protected 
concerted activity). 
 126. For example, in Detroit Medical Center, the General Counsel found that because the 
post was on Facebook and therefore viewable by many of the employee’s coworkers, the work 
environment was disrupted. Detroit Medical Center Advice Memo., supra note 29, at 5. 
Alternatively, in Wolters Kluwer, the General Counsel reasoned that because the employee 
made the statements on Twitter, there was little disruption to the workplace. Wolters Kluwer 
Advice Memo., supra note 85, at 6. This difference illustrates that the standard allows for 
consideration of whether there actually was disturbance at work, rather than assuming that a 
social media post will always or will never disturb the work environment. But see Triple Play, 
Case 34-CA-12915, at 10 (“The comments occurred during a Facebook conversation, and not at 
the workplace itself, so there is no possibility that the discussion would have disrupted [the] 
work environment.”) (emphasis added). 
 127. See Second Memo., supra note 20, at 24 (stating that the modified Atlantic Steel 
standard “considers not only disruption to workplace discipline, [but also] the alleged 
disparagement of the employer’s products and services.”).  
 128. Detroit Medical Center Advice Memo., supra note 29, at 4–5. 
 129. See Second Memo., supra note 20, at 24 (“[T]he Atlantic Steel analysis does not 
usually consider the impact of disparaging comments made to third parties.”). 
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about his coworkers.
130
 Likewise, because the Atlantic Steel test was 
developed for outbursts on the shop floor
131
 and not outbursts made 
online, the test is often stretched and pulled to accommodate the 
social media situation.
132
 
Moreover, a federal court has held Atlantic Steel should not be 
stretched to cover situations too far outside of its original facts.
133
 In 
Starbucks, the Second Circuit held Atlantic Steel did not apply when 
the employee shouted obscenities at his employer in front of 
customers.
134
 Instead, the Atlantic Steel test was strictly reserved for 
comments made in front of the employer and other employees.
135
 If 
the Second Circuit’s interpretation of Atlantic Steel is adopted in 
other circuits, it could prevent utilizing the doctrine in social media 
cases where the Internet is considered a public space viewable to 
customers. 
Despite these limitations, the Atlantic Steel test provides a strong 
framework for the analysis of when a social media post that would 
 
 130. Although this example is not one of concerted activity, it is nonetheless illustrative of 
how social media posts about employees may lead to negative inferences about their employers. 
In 2013, a Facebook post featuring a photograph of a Taco Bell employee licking taco shells 
became a viral internet sensation and impugned Taco Bell’s reputation. See Taco Bell Employee 
Appears to Be Licking A Bunch of Taco Shells In This Facebook Photo, HUFFINGTON POST, 
June 4, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/03/taco-bell-worker-licking_n_3377 
709.html [hereinafter Taco Bell] (stating that the photo “may make us think twice before buying 
our next Doritos Locos Taco”). In essence, the post is a disparaging statement about one 
employee—this employee does not care about food safety—but a disparaging inference can be 
drawn about the employer.  
 131. See Second Memo., supra note 20, at 24 (recognizing “that a Facebook posting does 
not exactly mirror the situation in an Atlantic Steel analysis, which typically focuses on whether 
the communications would disrupt or undermine shop discipline”). The employee in Atlantic 
Steel cursed at his foreman on the production floor. 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 814 (1979). 
 132. Social media complicates the analysis, because the message is potentially seen by 
third parties and could result in harm to the employer’s reputation. In general, the decisions thus 
far recognize that while social media posts have a broader audience than a statement made on 
the production floor, they do not gain a universal audience. See, e.g., Wolters Kluwer Advice 
Memo., supra note 85, at 4 (The post “may also be viewed by some small number of non-
employee members of the public.”). However, the facts of the cases also show how quickly 
social media posts can circulate. See id. at 2 (stating that even though none of the employee’s 
coworkers followed him on Twitter, someone from Ektron nevertheless saw the tweet). 
 133. NLRB v. Starbucks, 679 F.3d 70, 79 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. (“When the Board formulated its four-factor test in Atlantic Steel for determining 
whether an employee’s obscenities would cause the employee to lose the protection of the 
[NLRA], it was not considering obscenities in a public place in the presence of customers.”). 
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otherwise be protected concerted activity loses its protection because 
of the opprobrious nature of its language. Following Starbucks, 
however, the NLRB
136
 and courts must recognize that using this test 
in a social media context does not require a traditional Atlantic Steel 
or Jefferson Standard analysis.
137
 Before relying on Atlantic Steel, 
Jefferson Standard, and their progeny in a social media setting, the 
NLRB and courts must consider whether social media gives rise to 
the same concerns as in traditional settings and adapt the factors as 
necessary. 
First, the NLRB and courts should consider the most traditional 
elements of the Atlantic Steel test: what is the subject matter of the 
employee’s post and was it provoked by an unfair labor practice?138 
Where the subject matter is unrelated to a traditionally protected topic 
of conversation, the balance would tip towards a finding of 
opprobriousness; where the post was provoked by an unfair labor 
practice, the balance would tip towards a finding of protection. This 
portion of the test is unaffected by its application to social media. 
Second, the NLRB and courts must consider any effect the post 
has on the day-to-day operations of the workplace.
139
 Although social 
media posts are generally external to the workplace, they can result in 
serious disruption to the work environment and to other employees.
140
 
Therefore, as in Detroit Medical Center, courts should consider the 
actual impact a post has on the work environment, even if the post 
occurred outside of the work environment.
141
 
 
 136. “The NLRB,” as used here and throughout the proposal, includes the policy and 
decision makers within the agency, including the General Counsel and the ALJs. 
 137. See Leonard & Hendry, supra note 22, at 224 (“The lesson [of Starbucks] is that 
Atlantic Steel is not always appropriate . . . .”).  
 138. See Wolters Kluwer Advice Memo., supra note 85, at 4 (“The application of two of 
the Atlantic Steel factors to a social media posting is straight forward: the subject matter and 
whether the discussion was provoked by an unfair labor practice.”). 
 139. See Second Memo., supra note 20, at 24 (“[A] modified Atlantic Steel analysis that 
considers . . . disruption to workplace discipline . . . .”). 
 140. For example, in Detroit Medical Center, other employees vandalized the locker of the 
employee who posted on Facebook. Detroit Medical Center Advice Memo., supra note 29, at 3. 
The vandalism caused the employee to fear returning to work. Id. Likewise, an employee who 
learned her coworkers posted negative messages about her on Facebook reportedly became so 
distraught over the posts that she had a heart attack. Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 
N.L.R.B. No. 37, 12 (2012). 
 141. The analysis should therefore depart from Triple Play, where the ALJ reasoned that 
there was “no possibility” that a Facebook discussion could impact the work environment. 
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Third, the NLRB and courts must consider the nature of the 
outburst. In traditional cases not involving social media, this factors-
based analysis includes consideration of the substance of the outburst, 
such as whether the employee used profane language.
142
 Minor 
outbursts of profanity should be protected, as they traditionally have 
been.
143
 Continuing this protection makes sense in a social media 
context—profanity on the internet is commonplace and not 
shocking.
144
 Despite the risk that a customer would see the social 
media posts,
145
 as in Triple Play,
146
 this fact should not be 
dispositive.
147
 
Fourth, the NLRB and courts must borrow from Jefferson 
Standard to ask whether the post potentially harms the company.
148
 
While not requiring proof of harm
149
 for this factor to weigh in favor 
of finding opprobriousness, there should be a legitimate probability 
the social media post could, in fact, harm the company. This inquiry 
should be highly fact-specific. A smaller company, for example, is 
more likely to be harmed than a larger, well-entrenched company;
150
 
a comment made to one’s “friends” on Facebook is less likely to 
harm the company than a viral video;
151
 and a post stating that “X 
 
Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille, NLRB, Case 34-CA-12915 (Div. of Judges Jan. 3, 2012). 
 142. See, e.g., Felix Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 251 F.3d 1051, 1054–55 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(An analysis under “nature of outburst” includes a discussion of both the language the 
employee used and whether the employee threatened violence.). 
 143. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text. 
 144. See Matthew J.X. Malady, No Offense, SLATE (July 1, 2013), http://www.slate.com/ 
articles/life/the_good_word/2013/07/swear_words_old_and_new_sexual_and_religious_profani
ty_giving_way_to_sociological.html. 
 145. A customer seeing the social media posts could potentially raise the Second Circuit’s 
concerns in Starbucks. See NLRB v. Starbucks, 679 F.3d 70, 79–80 (2d Cir. 2012); see also 
supra notes 135–39 and accompanying text. 
 146. See Triple Play, Case 34-CA-12915, at 10. 
 147. Id. at 4, 10 (holding that an employee’s protected concerted activity did not lose its 
protection when customers saw that she called the owner an “asshole” on Facebook). 
 148. See Second Memo., supra note 20, at 24 (using “a modified Atlantic Steel analysis 
that considers . . . the alleged disparagement of the employer’s products and services . . . .”). 
 149. Compare with Triple Play, Case 34-CA-12915, at 10 (“[T]here is insufficient 
evidence to find that [the employees’] comments resulted in some sort of harm to [the 
employer’s] business.”). 
 150. For example, although McDonald’s #McDStories incident was surely embarrassing, 
there is no indication that the company was significantly harmed. See supra note 44 and 
accompanying text. 
 151. However, the fact that the employee intended a post to only be circulated to his friends 
does not actually stop the post from reaching a far greater audience. For example, in 2013, a 
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Company did” something is more likely to harm the employer than a 
statement that does not identify the company.
152
 Additionally, the 
Jefferson Standard limitation seen in Detroit Medical Center should 
be discarded, because social media posts that do not pointedly 
disparage the employer or its services still have the potential to hurt 
an employer’s reputation.153 
Finally, it is critical that the opprobriousness standard remain a 
high standard—in other words, protected concerted activity should 
seldom lose its protection for opprobriousness, even in the social 
media context.
154
 This is so for a number of reasons. First, it is not 
clear if employees’ social media posts actually and seriously injure 
employers’ reputations.155 Additionally, a high standard leads to more 
predictable results.
156
 Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, 
only social media comments that are in fact concerted activity receive 
protection.
157
 Therefore, the majority of social media posts by 
employees are likely unprotected, because they simply are not 
concerted activity and an opprobriousness review is irrelevant. 
Although this Note’s approach does not create a bright line test, a 
flexible and workable test is more desirable because of the 
continually changing technology of the Internet. For example, 
employers might fear viral messages that result in significant 
 
photo of a Taco Bell employee licking taco shells at work became a viral hit, even though the 
photo was initially posted to a private Facebook wall. See Taco Bell, supra note 130 and 
accompanying text.  
 152. See Leonard & Hendry, supra note 22, at 224–25 (noting that the social media 
decisions to date fail to consider “how or if the employee has identified to his Facebook friends 
the name of his employer and/or his affiliation with that employer”). 
 153. See Detroit Medical Center Advice Memo., supra note 29, at 5. 
 154. See NLRB v. Ill. Tool Works, 153 F.2d 811, 815–16 (7th Cir. 1946) (reasoning that 
protection should only be lost in “flagrant cases in which the misconduct is so violent or of such 
serious character as to render the employee unfit for further service”). 
 155. See generally supra note 44; see also Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille, NLRB, Case 
34-CA-12915 (Div. of Judges Jan. 3, 2012) (“insufficient evidence” that the posts harmed the 
employer). 
 156. See Ill. Tool Works, 153 F.2d at 815–16 (Only “flagrant cases” lose protection.). 
 157. The NLRA only protects employees engaged in collective activity. See 29 U.S.C. 
§ 151 (2012). Personal grievances are not protected by the NLRA. See NLRB v. City Disposal 
Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 833 n.10 (1984) (“[I]f an employer were to discharge an employee for 
purely personal ‘griping,’ the employee could not claim the protection of § 7.”). 
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negative publicity for their companies.
158
 But changes in social media 
could limit this risk. Snapchat, for example, has recently become a 
major social media platform that allows users to send each other 
messages that disappear in seconds,
159
 thereby minimizing one major 
concern of employers. As social media platforms transform,
160
 the 
concerns of employers and employees will likewise change, and a 
flexible standard will best respond to these needs. 
CONCLUSION 
By adopting and adapting the modified Atlantic Steel test for use 
in social media cases, the NLRB and courts will have a consistent 
standard for analyzing whether otherwise protected concerted activity 
loses its protection because of opprobriousness. The standard 
responds to an employer’s concern that an employee’s social media 
posts can hurt both the workplace and the company’s reputation to 
third parties, yet still provides protection for an employee to engage 
in concerted activity on social media. Although social media creates a 
greater risk for employers than traditional employee speech around 
the water cooler,
161
 the risks for employers are not so great that 
otherwise protected concerted activity should be curtailed. 
 In many ways, this proposal merely adds a procedure to the 
current analysis of social media cases, but this procedure is 
important.
162
 With inexact standards, neither employees nor their 
 
 158. According to a recent survey, the greatest concern employers had about social media 
was negative comments about their company. GRANTTHORNTON, SOCIAL MEDIA RISKS & 
REWARDS 8 (Sept. 2013), available at http://www.grantthornton.com/~/media/content-page-
files/advisory/pdfs/2013/ADV-social-media-survey.ashx. 
 159. Jenna Wortham, A Growing App Lets You See It, Then You Don’t, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 
2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/09/technology/snapchat-a-growing-app-
lets-you-see-it-then-you-dont.html?_r=0. 
 160. See, e.g., Jayson DeMers, The Top 7 Social Media Marketing Trends That Will 
Dominate 2014, FORBES, Sept. 24, 2013, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/jayson 
demers/2013/09/24/the-top-7-social-media-marketing-trends-that-will-dominate-2014/ (predicting 
changes to social media for the coming year for the marketing industry). 
 161. See Hispanics United of Buffalo, No. 3-CA-27872, 2011 WL 3894520 (Div. of Judges 
Sept. 2, 2011); see also Leonard & Hendry, supra note 28, at 200 (arguing that analogizing 
social media posts to the company’s “water cooler” is improper). 
 162. Procedure and transparency may be particularly important for the NLRB, because it is 
frequently lambasted by its opponents. See Steven Greenhouse, Labor Board’s Exiting Leader 
Responds to Critics, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/ 
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employers can understand the contours that exist regarding NLRA 
protection of social media speech. Inevitably, this will result in either 
filings with the NLRB and ultimately litigation, or the forfeiture of 
employees’ rights.163 The modified Atlantic Steel test can provide 
employers with a framework to analyze employment policies and 
decisions regarding social media, in order to avoid violations of 
statutory rights and to protect employees’ concerted activity.164
 
30/business/national-labor-boards-leader-leaves-amid-criticism.html?pagewanted=all (discussing 
political criticism of the NLRB under President Obama and his predecessors). Although the 
NLRA has been in effect for more than seventy-five years, the NLRB continues to face political 
opposition. Id. The same actions that the NLRB’s supporters would call incremental are seen as 
monumental by detractors. See id. 
 163. Moreover, the limited awareness of non-unionized employees of their statutory rights, 
combined with the minimal statutory remedies provided to an employee under the NLRA, 
minimizes the incentive of employers to act in full compliance with the law. See supra text 
accompanying note 25; see also Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 
102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1553–54 (2002). 
 164. Employment law should be proactive in that employers should take steps ahead of 
time to ensure compliance with the law. In other areas of employment law, this emphasis on 
taking proactive steps is more apparent. For example, in preventing discrimination, scholars 
argue for changes in law and policy that would reward employers who took proactive steps to 
eliminate issues of unequal opportunity. See David Charny & G. Mitu Gulati, Efficiency-Wages, 
Tournaments, and Discrimination: A Theory of Employment Discrimination Law For “High-
Level” Jobs, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57, 61 (1998). 
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